Liberalism and Victorian musical sympathy. by Zon,  Bennett
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
07 March 2018
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Zon, Bennett (2020) 'Liberalism and Victorian musical sympathy.', in Music and Victorian Liberalism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 180-200.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108628778.009
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Liberalism and Victorian Musical Sympathy 
Bennett Zon 
 
Liberalism is a fundamentally polyphonic proposition, its relationship to music deep and 
broad, historical and philosophical.  This chapter in the Victorian liberalism uses John Rawls’ 
concept of ‘overlapping consensus’ to map conceptual territories.  Rawls’ liberalism has 
already received considerable exploration amongst musicologists because he uses the 
symphony orchestra as a metaphor to characterize the concept of overlapping consensus,1 and 
the life-story of his classic book A Theory of Justice (1971) has been made into a musical A 
Theory of Justice: The Musical (2013), but it would seem as if little has been made of 
overlapping consensus in the area of Victorian musical culture.  I use overlapping consensus 
differently from the way Rawls himself uses it, however.  Rawls uses music to defend 
overlapping consensus, describing two different types of orchestras: one of equally talented 
players; the other, unequally talented players, but both achieving similar results.  I use music 
specifically to test the presence and activity of an underlying liberal concept—sympathy.  
Rawls himself describes a liberal as ‘the perfectly sympathetic being.’2  I aim to prove that 
Victorian music not only illustrates overlapping consensus (to use Rawls’ own description of 
what he does),3 but creates it through the emotion of sympathy.  According to Michael 
Freeden, the essence of Rawls’ liberal theory can be divided into two components, 
libertarianism and egalitarianism,4 and so this chapter is structured similarly.  I begin with an 
introduction to liberalism, overlapping consensus and its Victorian antecedents.  A section on 
Victorian sympathy follows, highlighting the central role of Herbert Spencer and Charles 
                                                          
1 See Nancy S. Love, Musical Democracy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), particularly 
Chapter 3, ‘Rawlsian Harmonies: Orchestrating Consensus’, 45-66. 
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, rev ed., 1999), 162. 
3 Nancy S. Love, ‘Rawlsian Harmonies: Overlapping Consensus Symphony Orchestra’, Theory, Culture & Society, 
20.6 (2003): 121-40, 133. 
4 Michael Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 95. 
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Darwin, which is itself followed by the main section of the chapter.  That section opens with 
a brief account of liberal musical sympathy, and is then divided into two conceptually inter-
related sections on libertarianism and egalitarianism.  Libertarianism covers the concept of 
individual freedom underlying the vastly popular work of John Curwen, founder of the Tonic 
Sol-fa movement; egalitarianism interrogates the way equality operates within the 
evolutionary musicology of C. Hubert H. Parry.  A conclusion summarizes key points and 
ponders the reasons for a post-Victorian evanescence in musical sympathy. 
 
 
1. Liberalism 
 
Any definition of liberalism is, by its very nature, a contradiction in terms.  Michael Freeden 
claims that ‘There is no single unambiguous thing called liberalism [. . .] it may therefore be 
more accurate to talk about liberalism in the plural, all part of a broad family exhibiting both 
similarities and differences.’5  Liberalisms may typify the conundrum of liberalism, but in 
theory and practice even the conceptually capacious term liberalisms seems inadequate when 
describing the multiplicity of competing political and ideological demands of liberalism more 
generally.  Liberalism, according to Amanda Anderson, is fundamentally ‘bleak’: ‘a 
pessimism or bleakness of attitude that derives from awareness of all those forces and 
conditions that threaten the realization of liberal ambitions.’6  Inevitably, not everyone 
agrees; without sacrificing optimism Jonathan Quong, for example, argues for ‘liberalism 
without perfection’.7  Quong attacks the liberal perfectionism underpinning Anderson’s 
bleakness by rallying to the cry of another, arguably more positive kind of liberalism—
political liberalism.  Hotly contested for being too ‘thin’ to encompass society in all its 
                                                          
5 Freeden, Liberalism, 1-2. 
6 Amanda Anderson, Bleak Liberalism (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2016), 22. 
7 See Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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multicultural diversity,8 political liberalism nevertheless espouses an inherently more positive 
approach to liberalism.  Martha Nussbaum encapsulates this attitude when exploring the 
ideological substructure in John Rawls’ classic Political Liberalism (1993):  
Can liberal constitutional democracy, built on values of mutual respect and 
reciprocity, be stable—not just as a grudging modus vivendi but out of robust ethical 
commitment—in a world of religious and secular pluralism?  Or, to use his words, 
‘[H]ow is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and 
equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines?’9   
Rawls’s famous answer to this intractable problem is ‘overlapping consensus’.  Admittedly 
contentious, the concept of overlapping consensus applies—as David Thomas suggests10—to 
today as much as it might to the Victorian period very broadly.  According to Rawls, 
overlapping consensus is  
moral both in its object and grounds, and so is distinct from a consensus, inevitably 
fragile, founded solely on self- or group-interest, even when ordered by a well-framed 
constitution.  The idea of an overlapping consensus enables us to understand how a 
constitutional regime characterized by the fact of pluralism might, despite its deep 
divisions, achieve stability and social unity by the public recognition of a reasonable 
political conception of justice.11 
  
It is debatable whether the Victorians would have recognized Rawls’s concept of overlapping 
consensus, but certainly, according to George Levine, his intentions broadly mirror Victorian 
                                                          
8 Iris Marion Young, ‘Survey Article: Rawls’s Political Liberalism’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 3.2 (1995): 
[181-90], 181. 
9 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Introduction’, in Thom Brooks and Martha C. Nussbaum (eds), Rawls’s Political Liberalism 
(New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2015), [1-56], 3. 
10 David Wayne Thomas, Cultivating Victorians: Liberal Culture and the Aesthetic (Philadelphia, PA: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 15-16. 
11 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7.1 (1987): [1-25], 2. 
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liberal aspirations of the period, not least in its seemingly unstoppable trajectory towards 
secularism.  In Realism, Ethics and Secularism: Essays on Victorian Literature and Science 
(2008) Levine propounds an overlapping consensus based on culturally instantiated aspects 
of individual and social life, law and behaviour.12  Charles Taylor would later provide a not 
dissimilar template in A Secular Age (2007); for him overlapping consensus is the agreement 
on a politics of solidarity—on humanitarian action—amongst people widely diverse and 
divergent in religious and ideological background.13  Taylor, like Levine, espouses a concept 
of overlapping consensus which, like liberalism, focuses on ethical cooperation.  Rawls 
himself speaks about ‘the virtues of tolerance and being ready to meet others halfway, and the 
virtue of reasonableness and the sense of fairness.’14  As Dietmar Rothermund explains, 
although Rawls may not refer to ‘negotiation’ or ‘compromise’ overlapping consensus is 
fundamentally a concept rooted in the reasonableness of cooperation—a concept Victorians 
would certainly have understood and promulgated.15  Herbert Spencer had argued for 
cooperation in Social Statics (1851), and it resurfaces in Principles of Sociology (1874-96) as 
part of his multi-volume Synthetic Philosophy (1862-97).  In Principles of Sociology he 
anticipates Rawls by presupposing the sociological advantage of cooperative reasonableness: 
‘A society, in the sociological sense, is formed only when, besides juxtaposition, there is co-
operation.  Co-operation is made possible by society, and makes society possible.  It pre-
supposes associated men; and men remain associated because of the benefits co-operation 
yields them.  But there cannot be concerted actions without agencies by which actions are 
adjusted in their times, amounts, and kinds; and the actions cannot be of various kinds 
without the co-operators undertaking different duties.  That is to say, the co-operators must 
                                                          
12 George Levine, Realism, Ethics and Secularism: Essays on Victorian Literature and Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 210. 
13 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2007), 693. 
14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 157. 
15 Dietmar Rothermund, ‘Negotiating Compromises in Cross-cultural Conversations’, in Anindita N. Balslev 
(ed.), On India: Self-Image and Counter-Image (Los Angeles et al: Sage, 2013), [133-146], 138. 
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become organized, either voluntarily or involuntarily.’16  For Rawls ‘reasonable persons see 
that the burdens of judgment set limits to what can be reasonably justified to others, and so 
they endorse some form of livery of conscience and freedom of thought.’17  Rothermund 
draws our attention to their similarities by invoking an incisive, historically alternative 
reading of Spencerian evolutionism.  Spencer coined the term ‘survival of the fittest’ in the 
context of social cooperation, where the fittest were not (as caricatured in later debates about 
evolutionism) determined to trample competition at all costs, but were in fact ‘the most 
resourceful co-operators—or, in Rawls’ terms, the most reasonable persons rather than the 
‘outrageous’ rationalists who maximized their interest regardless of others.’18  Richard P. 
Hiskes echoes Rothermund and many others when he claims that Spencer—like many 
Victorians, and perhaps most—viewed cooperation not as the end of evolution but as its 
means, and its individuals the moving forces in its process.19 
 
2. Sympathy 
The evolutionary advantage of cooperation is attested in literature ranging across the sciences 
and humanities.  Karl Sigmund, for example, spells it out in genetic terms in ‘Sympathy and 
Similarity: The Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation’ (2009): ‘The advantage of mutual 
help is threatened by defectors, who exploit the benefits provided by others without providing 
benefits in return.  Cooperation can only be sustained it is preferentially channelled toward 
cooperators and away from defectors.’20  Discussion of cooperation at the level of gene is 
commonplace in modern science—see for example debates whirling around Richard 
                                                          
16 Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology (1874-96), cited in F. Howard Collins, An Epitome of The Synthetic 
Philosophy (London: Williams and Norgate: 1889), 448-49. 
17 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 61. 
18 Rothermund, ‘Negotiating Compromises in Cross-cultural Conversations’, 139. 
19 Richard P. Hiskes, ‘Spencer and the Liberal Idea of Community’, in John Offer (ed.), Herbert Spencer: Critical 
Assessments, Volume 4 (London and New York; Routledge, 2000), [43-55] 49-51. 
20 Karl Sigmund, ‘Sympathy and Similarity: The Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation’, Proceedings of the 
national Academy of Sciences, 106.21 (2009): [8405-8406], 8405. 
6 
 
Dawkin’s assessment of altruism in The Selfish Gene (1976), or Mark Ridley’s eponymously 
titled The Cooperative Gene: How Mendel’s Demon Explains the Evolution of Complex 
Beings (2001).21  While Victorians might not have understood the genetic origins of 
cooperation they did appreciate its evolutionary implications for human behaviour, 
particularly in the form of emotional sympathy.  Here again Herbert Spencer speaks for a 
multitude when he claims that  
The evolution of those highest social sentiments which have sympathy for their root, 
has been all along checked by those activities which the struggle for existence 
between tribes and between nations has necessitated.  Only when the struggle for 
existence has ceased to go on under the form of war, can these highest social 
sentiments attain their full development.22 
  
Stretching back to the Greeks, the concept of sympathy has a longstanding place in the hearts 
and minds of British liberal thinkers.  Sympathy derives simply enough from the Greek sym 
and pathos: to suffer with (not unlike its Latin offspring compassion), but its simplicity belies 
an underlying cultural complexity—‘a dizzying range of rhetorical contexts that obfuscate its 
meaning.’23  Rob Boddice, accordingly, characterizes it as ‘a vehicle for translating the 
emotions of others [ . . .] an emotional disposition [. . . and] an emotional recognition of the 
plight of the object in question.’24  Victorians would have sympathized with Boddice’s 
predicament, as it were; for them the new evolutionary science of the emotion of sympathy—
typified in the works of Spencer, but manifestly problematized by Darwinism—also divided 
                                                          
21 See Jag Bhalia, ‘Selfish Genes Also Must Cooperate’ (guest blog, 12 June 2013), Scientific American, 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/selfish-genes-also-must-cooperate; and Mark Ridley, The 
Cooperative Gene: How Mendel’s Demon Explains the Evolution of Complex Beings (New York: The Free Press, 
2001). 
22 Spencer, Principles of Psychology (1870, 1880), in Collins, An Epitome of The Synthetic Philosophy, 229-30. 
23 Rob Boddice, The Science of Sympathy: Morality, Evolution, and Victorian Civilization (Urbana, Chicago and 
Springfield IL: University of Illinois Press, 2016), 3. 
24 Boddice, Science of Sympathy, 4. 
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opinion, not least on the origin and role moral actions play in the society at large.  For 
Darwin, moral actions are not culturally constructed, they are inherited instincts strengthened 
by habit, and although they operate at the level of individual they benefit the community as a 
whole.  In The Descent of Man (1871), for example, he opines that ‘the habit followed by the 
males of some social animals, of defending the community and of attacking their enemies or 
their prey in concert, may perhaps have originated from mutual sympathy.’25  Darwin would 
be unrelenting when pressed on the role of the individual as against that of society.  For him 
sympathy’s dizzying array of rhetorical contexts produced an opportunity for society to 
improve from the ground up—from the level of individual agent of sympathy: communities 
‘which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members, would flourish best, 
and rear the greatest number of offspring.’26  Darwin would come to extend evolutionary 
promise to the entire animal kingdom itself, but not without abandoning the Whiggish moral 
values of teleological progress.  For neo-Lamarckian Darwin, ‘as natural selection works 
solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to 
progress toward perfection.’27  Yet as this suggests, although an inherited instinct 
strengthened by habit, human sympathy also depended upon the development of 
reasonableness, to use Rawls’ term, and as Darwin’s own personal sentiments suggest, 
members of the human race did not all have it to the same extent—‘social lessers’ like 
children, women, ‘savages’, for example—because sympathy was a relatively recent 
evolutionary acquisition.28  
                                                          
25 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1871), 
Volume 1, 83. 
26 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1874), 
[VOL No.? – THIS JUST ONE VOLUME] 107. 
27 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1859), 489. 
28 Paul White, ‘Becoming and Animal: Darwin and the Evolution of Sympathy’, in Angelique Richardson (ed.), 
After Darwin: Animals, Emotions, and the Mind (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2013), [112-135], 127. 
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 In Darwin’s terms sympathy occurs ‘when we recognise that we ought to control our 
thoughts’;29 it is ‘the highest possible stage in moral culture’30 – the ‘virtue’ of ‘humanity’.31      
Darwin, I would suggest, underwrites Rawls’ ‘reasonable moral psychology’;32 not 
dissimilarly, for Martha Nussbaum Rawls proposes  
a society of human beings, not angels, and he knows well that human beings do not 
automatically pursue the common good.  Thus, even though in his well-ordered 
society problems of exclusion and hierarchy have been overcome, they have been 
overcome by human beings who still have the underlying tendencies that produce 
those problems.33   
Strangely enough, Nussbaum omits Darwin from her landmark Political Emotions, but she 
does invoke the name of an originally protean—if now largely unloved—philosophical voice 
in nineteenth-century liberal thought, Auguste Comte.  Alternately admired and detested by 
the Victorians34—and today of disputed liberal credentials35—Comte like Darwin after him 
believed that the individual expansion of sympathy and the corporate expansion of 
civilization were somehow symbiotically related.36  Comte, as controversial a figure as he 
was, played into the hands of a Victorian liberalism consumed by the need to explain that 
relationship, and the emotion of sympathy provided their answer.  The best way to promote 
humanity is to promote the emotion of sympathy, and the best way to promote sympathy is to 
cultivate ‘the spirit of universal brotherhood’37—cooperation, in as many words; overlapping 
consensus, in others; liberalisms in the broadest sense of meaning.  As John Glendening so 
                                                          
29 Darwin, Descent of Man (1871), 101. 
30 Darwin, Descent of Man (1874), 123. 
31 Darwin, Descent of Man (1871), 101. 
32 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 82. 
33 Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge, MA and London: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 10. 
34 See Robert C. Scharff, Comte After Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
35 Brigid Lowe, Victorian Fiction and the Insights of Sympathy: An Alternative to the Hermeneutics of Suspicion 
(London, New York and Delhi: Anthem Press, 2007), 153. 
36 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 59. 
37 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 61. 
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aptly puts it, for writers like Thomas Hardy Darwin bases his explanation for the origin of 
morality ‘on the “social instincts” of gregarious species and the sympathy that accrues from 
these instincts as they reinforce cooperation and the survival value it bestows.’38 
 
 
3. Liberal Musical Sympathy 
 
If anything typifies the consensually overlapping spirit of liberalisms surely it must be the 
individual and corporate activity Chris Small calls ‘musicking’;39 and music is by its very 
nature intrinsically sympathetic40—Roger Scruton describes it as ‘a dance with sympathy’.41  
Scruton follows in a long line of philosophers who accord musical emotion an almost 
transcendental status.42  It conjures up ‘a pure world of sympathy, in which they [musical 
emotions] exist in their completed form, unsullied by self-interest’,43 yet it is also ‘a 
character-forming force’: ‘Nobody’, he asserts,  
who understands the experiences of melody, harmony, and rhythm will doubt their 
value.  Not only are they the distillation of centuries of social life: they are also forms 
of knowledge, providing the competence to reach out of ourselves through music.  
Through melody, harmony, and rhythm, we enter a world where others exists besides 
the self, a world that is full of feeling but also ordered, disciplined but free.  That is 
why music is a character-forming force.44   
                                                          
38 John Glendending, The Evolutionary Imagination in Late-Victorian Novels: An Entangled Bank, Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2007/2016, 80. 
39 See Christopher Small, Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening (Middletown CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1998). 
40 See Guiseppe Gerbino, ‘Reflection: Music and Sympathy’, in Eric Schliesser (ed.), Sympathy: A History, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), [102-106 IS THE PAGE RANGE], 102-106. 
41 See Jeanette Bicknell, ‘Scruton on Understanding Music’, Nordisk Estetisk Tidskrift, 25-6 (2002): 132-143, and 
especially section 2, ‘Sympathy and Involvement with Music’, 138-140. 
42 Ferdia J. Stone-Davis, ‘Entering the Unknown: Music, Self and God, in James Bryson (ed.), The Religious 
Philosophy of Roger Scruton (London et al: Bloomsbury, 2016), [165-178], 169. 
43 Scruton, cited in Stone-Davis, ‘Entering the Unknown’, 169. 
44 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 502. 
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Scruton speaks a language with which many Victorian liberals would have identified; 
according to Spencer:  
In its bearings upon human happiness, this emotional language which musical culture 
develops and refines is only second in importance to the language of the intellect; 
perhaps not even second to it.  For these modifications of voice produced by feelings 
are the means of exciting like feelings in others.  Joined with gestures and expressions 
of face, they give life to the otherwise dead words in which the intellect utters its 
ideas, and so enable the hearer not only to understand the state of mind they 
accompany, but to partake of that state.  In short they are the chief media of 
sympathy.45   
For Spencer musical sympathy creates social altruism; indeed, musical sympathy generates 
our ability to repress ‘the antagonistic elements of our characters and to develop the social 
ones; to curb our purely selfish desires and exercise our unselfish ones; to replace private 
gratifications by gratifications resulting from or involving the pleasure of others’; it is ‘by this 
adaptation to the social state that the sympathetic side of our nature is being unfolded.’46  
Darwin describes music in almost identical terms; for him music reproduces primitive 
emotions experienced with functions of survival, such as procreation, rivalry and courtship: 
‘sensations and ideas excited in us by music, or by the cadences of impassioned oratory, 
appear from their vagueness, yet depth, like mental reversions to the emotions and thoughts 
of a long-past age;47 indeed, music recalls ‘in a vague and indefinite manner, those strong 
emotions which were felt during long-past ages, when, as is probable, our early progenitors 
                                                          
45 Herbert Spencer, ‘The Origin and Function of Music’, Fraser’s Magazine (Oct. 1857), in Herbert Spencer, 
Literary Style and Music: Including Two Short Essays on Gracefulness and Beauty (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1951), 73-74. 45–106. [Original Emphasis? – YES – ALSO NOTE ADDITIONAL ITALCS FOR THE WORD 
SYMPATHY ITSELF] 
46 Spencer, ‘The Origin and Function of Music’, 74; 74. [what does the semi-colon indicate here? – TWO 
SEPARATE QUOTATIONS] 
47 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, 2 vols., (London: John Murray, 1871), 
Volume 2, 336. 
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courted each other by the aid of vocal tones.  And as several of our strongest emotions—
grief, great joy, love, and sympathy—lead to the free secretion of tears, it is not surprisingly 
that music should be apt to cause our eyes to be suffused with tears, especially when we are 
already softened by the tenderer feelings.’48  Amongst these music-emotion survivals Darwin 
hierarchizes, the true emotion of courtship: ‘Love’, Darwin claims, ‘is still the commonest 
themes of our own songs.’49 
 
3a. Libertarianism 
These descriptions of musical sympathy may give the wrong impression—that our emotional 
reaction to music is almost involuntary, as some recent research would seem to suggest.50  
But in this respect Scruton, Spencer and Darwin reflect a characteristically Victorian 
understanding of emotion, and with it the virtuous circle of self-improvement; as Nussbaum 
says of Comte: ‘Becoming virtuous is a matter of cultivating appropriate habits, in emotion as 
in conduct.’51  But there is more to Victorian musical sympathy than the alignment of 
emotion and conduct.  For Spencer, Darwin and like thinkers musical sympathy is at the heart 
of both libertarian and egalitarian thinking, on the one hand promoting liberty through beliefs 
such as political freedom, autonomy and self-determination, and on the other hand through an 
array of concepts linked to equality. When Spencer proclaimed musical emotions to be the 
chief media of sympathy he was pushing an open door, not simply at the level of social 
engagement (in the way Rawls suggests an orchestra emblemizes liberalism) but at the level 
of musical practice itself.  At its most basic, libertarianism is a belief in the naturally inviolate 
rights of and respect for others, even if the instantiation of those rights and respect can 
                                                          
48 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (London: John Murray, 1872), 219. 
49 Charles Darwin, Descent of Man, 336. 
50 See Amy Meredith Belfi, ‘A Neuropsychological Investigation of Music, Emotion, and Autobiographical 
Memory’, PhD diss., University of Iowa (2015). 
51 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 65. 
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potentially produce poor results.52  For Spencer libertarianism is grounded in a sentiment of 
justice, itself fuelled by sympathy; this was basis of a well-ordered society.53  According to 
Spencer ‘sympathy is the basis of all the social sentiments’.54  Musical sympathy facilitates 
this by liberating language from its inability to communicate emotion directly.   
Tonic Sol-fa provides a good example of musical sympathy in a number of ways.  
Founded by John Curwen in the 1840s Tonic Sol-fa originated in the kind of low-church 
congregationalism which tended to favour musical simplicity and purely melodic singing 
accompanied by the organ and choir.  Curwen accepts that to some extent all congregational 
singing ‘must yield to the unisonous element’, however harmony is by its very nature more 
emotionally advanced: there is a ‘charm’, he opines,  
in that variety in unity, that wondrous blending of voices [. . .]. It suits the instincts of 
the human heart.  It suits the worship of God.  This cordial fellowship of various 
sounds, this rich confluence of melodious streams, is most becoming to the assembly 
of saints.  It speaks of holy rivalry and blending sympathies.55  
Theist Curwen and atheist Spencer may diverge over religion but sympathy brings their 
libertarianisms together; in fact Curwen treats harmony the way Spencer treats music—as an 
evolutionary apogee driven and liberated by emotion.  For Spencer music is impassioned 
speech—‘the idealized language of emotion’;56 for Curwen harmony is impassioned 
melody—‘the natural constitution of our voices’, he suggests, ‘the proper scope and range for 
striking and varied melody, as well as the Christian’s desire to bring a full and perfect 
                                                          
52 Jason Brennan, Libertarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xi. 
53 Herbert Spencer, ‘From Freedom to Bondage’, in T. Mackay (ed.), A Plea for Liberty (1891), cited in Michael 
Taylor (ed.), Herbert Spencer and the Limits of the State: The Late Nineteenth-Century Debate between 
Individualism and Collectivism (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), [3-23], 23. 
54 Jay Rumney, Herbert Spencer’s Sociology (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 1961/2017), 60. 
55 John Curwen, ‘”What To Do,” and “How To Do It.”: A Lecture on Congregational Psalmody’, The Toni Sol-Fa 
Reporter, And Magazine of Vocal Music for the People, 1 (1853): [12-15], 12; 12-13. 
56 Spencer, ‘The Origin and Function of Music’, 69. 
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offering of praise, all combine to favour Harmony.’57 Curwen also describes unisonous 
singing like the state, claiming it makes little use of the people and treats them as ‘a company 
of incapables.  It makes much of the choir and the organ.  We would make much of the 
people, and make little of the choir and the organ.’58  Making much of the people (the 
congregation) involves a concomitant dismantling of the state (the choir and organ), and at 
the same time requires the cultivation of sympathy, or altruism—‘in some cases one of these 
[melodies] must be sacrificed to the other’—if as a form of liberalism it hopes to achieve the 
cooperative state of overlapping consensus; of holy rivalry and blending sympathies.  Every 
hymn and hymn tune has an emotional character (and individual identity) of its own, and the 
character of the hymn must sympathetically match its text the same way the harmony 
matches its melody.  At the same time, in the way that melody and text are ‘harmonized’ for 
the good of musical expression everyone should ‘make great sacrifices of “favourite” tunes, 
for the public good.’59 
As this suggests, musical altruism arises from more than an evangelical moral code— 
it emerges from an essentialized understanding of the music itself.  For evangelical Curwen 
music would not simply have prompted sympathetic emotions, it would have embodied them.  
Albert Blackwell makes a compelling case for music being ‘sacramental’.60  Following 
church fathers and more recent exegetical writing, for example, he maintains a Pythagorean 
approach with markedly liberal resonances: ‘there is a pervasive affinity or sympathy 
between the inanimate and the animate, between man’s psyche and the whole cosmos [. . . ] 
this cosmic sympathy affords the possibility of moral improvement through a patterning of 
the individual psyche on the cosmos.’61  That cosmic sympathy is incarnated 
                                                          
57 Curwen, ‘”What To Do”’, 13. 
58 Curwen, ‘”What To Do”’, 13. 
59 Curwen, ‘”What To Do”’, 13; 14. 
60 See Albert Blackwell, The Sacred in Music (Louisville KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999). 
61 F. M. Cornford, ‘Mysticism and Science in the Pythagorean Tradition’, in Alexander P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), 
The Pre-Socratics (Garden City NY: Anchor Books, 1974), 8. 
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(sacramentalized) in religious ritual.  According to Rudolph Otto, ‘We must have recourse to 
the way all other moods and feelings are transmitted, to a penetrative imaginative sympathy 
with what passes in the other person’s mind.’62  Blackwell and many other music theologians 
raise an important point about the sacramental nature of musical sympathy in religious 
contexts: emotions, as Don Saliers suggests, ‘the communal act of singing has formed and 
expressed deep human emotions.  Such emotions are not simply passing states of feeling or 
mood; they are capacities to consent to a sense of being in the world.  If music is the language 
of the soul made audible, then human voices conjoined in community are primary 
instruments of the collective soul—a medium for what transcends the immediately 
commonsense world.’63  Curwen would have admired these sentiments, not only because of 
their intrinsically theological import but because Tonic Sol-fa embodies liberal 
congregational embodiment in satisfyingly secular form, both in the music it teaches and the 
teaching its musicks. 
The music it teaches does not disappoint, if according to Blackwell and Saliers 
congregational music—which Curwen consistently describes as ‘people’ music—has the 
capacity to embody the structure of a reasonable, cooperative society.  Curwen developed his 
model at time when two systems, moveable and fixed doh, competed for hegemony: on the 
fixed side the ideologically fixed pedagogue John Hullah; on the moveable, Sarah Glover and 
her notional sidekick John Curwen.  The problem with fixed doh would seem obvious, but 
Hullah failed to recognize it until it was too late.  In the increasingly chromatic world of 
Romantic music modulation was frequent and frequently tonally distancing, and so a system 
in which C was always doh irrespective of its tonal function (as a tonic, dominant, 
subdominant, etc) would never have been tenable.  Curwen made the most of Hullah’s 
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intransigence, and turned Tonic Sol-fa into a massive popular success.  But the reasons for 
his success are not merely commercial; the music itself communicated an ideological 
liberalism Victorians wanted to hear.  Curwen used solfeggio the way Sarah Glover had—to 
render psalmody congregational—and he applied exactly the same moral to the musical tale: 
‘Transition, or ‘modulation,’ as it is called, may change the key note in the course of a tune, 
but the new key note governs its dependents exactly as the old one did.  Every apparent 
exception only proves the rule.’64  All pitches in other words, like all people, are created 
equal in the eyes of God.  Only their function differs.  All notes can serve any purpose; all 
notes are inherently free.  Moveable doh taught liberalism—even liberterianism. 
But what about sympathy?  Mixed doh was underpinned by a comparable structure in 
which emotions are sympathetically allocated to modulating positions in the scale.  Three 
columns represent foundational tonal hierarchies of tonic (doh-me-soh); dominant (ray-te) 
and subdominant (fah-lah); their comparable ‘mental effects’ (emotions) progress from (1) 
strong/firm-steady/calm-grand/bright and (2) rousing/hopeful-piercing/sensitive, to (3) 
desolate/awe-inspiring-sad/weeping; and hand signs reflect respective emotions: (1) doh, a 
fist; me, flat and horizontal; soh, an open palm facing towards the viewer; (2) ray, the hand 
tilted 45 degrees upward, fingers closed; te, the hand twisted, index finger pointing 45 
degrees upward; and (3) fah, a finger hanging 45 degrees downward limply from the rest of 
the hand; and lah, the hand drooping at 45 degrees.  A psychology of libertarianism, itself 
hotly contested today,65 is, I believe, embedded in this system.  Curwen not only liberates 
musical notes from previously fixed positions, he refuses to impose arbitrary structural 
constraints which limit the capacity of emotional experience and response.  Curwen, in other 
words, develops the emotion of sympathy as a sympathy for emotion so that music and 
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emotion can be aligned in a virtuous circle.  If, as Spencer claims, musical sympathy 
generates our ability to repress ‘the antagonistic elements of our characters and to develop the 
social ones; to curb our purely selfish desires and exercise our unselfish ones; to replace 
private gratifications by gratifications resulting from or involving the pleasure of others’,66 
Curwen achieves it in Tonic Sol-fa.  A seemingly materialistic stance may strike some 
readers as implausible, considering how deeply ingrained in Tonic Sol-fa is Curwen’s 
fundamentally evangelical background.  But, influenced as much by currents in the 
psychology of sensation as the history of evangelical theology, Curwen is arguably as much a 
scientist as evangelist, and for him, as for many, free will does not necessarily imply a lack of 
causality.67  Curwen pins the emotions to the scale to galvanize libertarian sentiment in the 
cause of freedom: are we not right in calling the scale, he asks, ‘the scale of all nations and of 
all times,– the scale to which the ear and the soul of man are attuned by the all-wise 
Creator.’68  Whether evangelicals can be libertarians is a question in point, but the two are not 
historically incompatible.  Curwen was deeply influenced by Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and 
Friedrich Froebel, founder of the kindergarten movement,,69 and both are claimed, perhaps 
controversially, as ancestors in libertarian and liberal thought: ‘For the vivid thought,’ 
Froebel considers, ‘the eternal itself, as such, requires and conditions free self-activity and 
self-determination of man, of the being created for freedom, and resemblance to God.’70  For 
Pestalozzi, as Curwen I would suggest, ‘song proper cannot be regarded as a means of rising 
from vague sense impressions to clear ideas, but rather as a faculty that must be developed’; 
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indeed, ‘The same laws of the physical mechanism that develop in me the sense-foundations 
of knowledge, are also the sense-means of facilitating my virtue.’71 
 
3b. Egalitarianism 
 
Facilitating virtue is at the centre of egalitarian thinking as well; it is, arguably, at the root of 
Rawls’ reasonable person.  Rawls himself says ‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, 
as truth is of systems of thought.’ 72  As Thomas Christiano suggests, ‘there is something 
about that person in virtue of which one owes it to that person to treat them in a certain 
way.’73  Virtue is also at the heart of Victorian sympathy.  Brigid Lowe, for example, 
explores in literature roughly the same type of ‘historical and political virtue of sympathy’74 
that Ruth Solie explores in music.  In Victorian musical culture ‘sympathy’, Solie claims, 
‘remained a positive virtue’.75  An observable elision between virtue and sympathy is 
widespread in Victorian musical culture, particularly in literary culture.  Delia de Sousa 
Correa discusses it in George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda (1876), for example, in a section of her 
book called ‘Musical sympathies: “meeting streams”’.  It is debatable, however, whether 
sympathy in that context describes the virtuous sympathy of the Spencerian imagination or in 
fact its opposite—something controlling and overtaking, a type of sympathy based upon 
clairvoyance and the experience of telepathic, hypnotic and uncanny sensations.76  Da Sousa 
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Correa does us a service, nevertheless, because she inadvertently highlights a key feature of 
the egalitarianism underylying Rawls’ concept of overlapping consensus—truth, and its 
relationship to virtue and ultimately the emotion of sympathy. 
 A good place to find these relationships problematized in musical culture — other 
than in the societal annals of the Tonic Sol-fa Reporter—is in the alternatively contentious 
evolutionary writings of C. Hubert H. Parry.  Evolutionism was itself both an equalizer and 
unequalizer, however, depending upon one’s place in the hermeneutical spectrum of 
Darwinian to non-Darwinian thought.  In musical culture, as in culture more broadly, 
divergent evolutionisms produced and embedded variable levels of human equality.  
Libertarian/egalitarian Spencer may have believed that musical emotion was the chief media 
of sympathy, but he also maintained, unsympathetically, that music was strictly a function of 
civilization and not all people had risen to its developmental apogee (i.e., savages).  Evidence 
of Spencer’s contradiction is abundant in Victorian musical culture, not just in semi-academic 
denigrations of non-Western music,77 but in popular literature capturing the nature of 
systemically degrading gendered inequality.  In fact non-Western savages and women are 
almost entirely identical in Spencerian musical sympathy.  It is worth noting, for example, the 
correspondence between race and gender implicitly structuring the teleological conviction of 
‘The Origin and Function of Music’ (1857).  Spencer begins his treatise with the description 
of emotional responses in a dog, and progresses up the Great Chain of Musical Being in 
evolutionary order, from infant and children to a woman (Mary) and a man (albeit an 
irascible one).  Similarly, when recapitulating the evolution of speech into music, he 
progresses from the songs of savages, the Chinese and Hindoos and the Quakers to the music 
of Mozart, Beethoven, Mendelssohn and Chopin.  More positively, perhaps, Darwin claims 
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with some adamance that all creatures make music, irrespective of their evolutionary position 
at any given time.  Here in The Descent of Man is the crux of Darwin’s argument:  
A critic has asked how the ears of man, and he ought to have added of other animals, 
could have been adapted by selection so as to distinguish musical notes. But this 
question shews some confusion on the subject; a noise is the sensation resulting from 
the co-existence of several aërial ‘simple vibrations’ of various periods, each of which 
intermits so frequently that its separate existence cannot be perceived. It is only in the 
want of continuity of such vibrations, and in their want of harmony inter se, that a 
noise differs from a musical note. Thus an ear to be capable of discriminating 
noises—and the high importance of this power to all animals is admitted by every 
one—must be sensitive to musical notes. We have evidence of this capacity even low 
down in the animal scale [crustaceans, gnats, dogs and seals].78   
While elsewhere in his writing Darwin would dig even deeper down the evolutionary chain to 
prove his point, his thesis was only a means to an end.  In fact Darwin uses music to prove 
kinship between humans and animals.79  The virtue—and for many Victorians the iniquity— 
of Darwin is his insistence on a material basis of egalitarianism. 
 Evolutionary egalitarianism forms as important a strand in scientific thinking today as 
it did in the Victorian period.  In recent research Sergey Gavrilets, for example, describes 
egalitarianism as a ‘syndrome’, and ‘one of the most intriguing unsolved puzzles related to 
the origin of humans.’80  Like most Victorian materialists Darwin would try, perhaps 
unsuccessfully in his case, to solve the problem of egalitarianism without reference to 
causality (Darwin sedulously maintains a ‘Creator’ in the last sentence of the second to sixth 
editions of The Origins of Species).  Music helped Darwin express egalitarianism because it 
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was linked to the intrinsically equalizing biological force of sexual selection rather than any 
designing God, and sexual selection was itself linked to the virtue of sympathy.  Music 
helped Spencer express egalitarianism, I believe, because it was linked to what scientists 
today call emotional selection, a belief that the mechanisms of natural and sexual selection 
are insufficient to explain a sense of self81—an impression Darwin himself gives throughout 
The Descent of Man.  Spencer encapsulates emotional selection in his essay ‘The Purpose of 
Art’ (1907?) where he correlates the advancement of music and emotional specialization:  
Doubtless certain amounts of intellectual perception, implying appropriate culture, are 
needful for making possible the pleasurable feelings which music is capable of 
producing.  These, however, are but means to an end, and it is a profound mistake to 
regard them as the end itself.  An analogy will help us here.  Before there can be 
sympathy there must have been gained some knowledge of the natural language of the 
emotions—what tones and changes of voice, what facial expressions, what 
movements of the body, signify certain states of mind.  But the knowledge of this 
natural language does not constitute sympathy.  There may be clear perception of the 
meanings of all these traits without any production of fellow feeling.  Similarly, then, 
with the distinction between the knowledge of musical expression in its complex 
developments, and the experience of those emotions to which the musical expression 
is instrumental.  Only in so far as its cultivated perceptions form a means to that 
excitement of the feelings which the composer intended to produce, does the intellect 
properly play a part; and even then, in playing its indispensible part, it is apt to 
interfere unduly.82 
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It can be no surprise that Victorian musicology –perhaps most notably the Oxford school of 
music criticism83 —espoused emotional selection, if as an egalitarian evolutionary principle 
the virtue of sympathy helped forge individual (and consequently social) human identity in its 
trajectory towards overlapping consensus.  Unrepentant, unreconstructed Spencerian acolyte 
C. Hubert H. Parry says as much throughout his writing, but it is especially pronounced in 
The Evolution of the Art of Music (1893/1896).  Parry prefaces his book with what is 
effectively a treatise on musical sympathy; for him the basis of all mature musical design— 
‘the ultimate origin of all music’—can be found in the ‘direct expression of feeling and an 
appeal to sympathetic feeling in others’.84  And like Spencer, Parry inevitably locates 
sympathy in a teleological projection encompassing the lowest to highest possible forms: 
‘The raw material of music’, he avers,  
is found in the expressive noises and cries which human beings as well as animals 
give vent to under excitement of any kind; and their contagious power is shown, even 
in the incipient stage, by the sympathy which they evoke in other sentient beings.  
Such cries pass within the range of art when they take any definite form, just as 
speech begin when vague signals of sound give place to words; and scales begin to be 
formed when musical figures become definite enough to be remembered.85   
Like all Victorians, Parry treats emotional selection selectively.  Sympathy not only elevates 
man above the animal world, it also forms the virtuous basis of cooperative society and with 
it the organizing factor in its complex structure.  And sympathy is not monochromatic; along 
with humanity more generally ‘there are many kinds of infinitely variable degrees of 
sympathy.’86  But there is a self-overlapping consensus – a liberal Parry-dox – subsisting 
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within the sympathy underyling these words, as there is in Spencer’s evolutionary conception 
of music—as there is in Victorian culture more broadly.  For all his egalitarianism Parry, like 
Spencer, believes in a Great Chain of Musical Being, even if he does concede to the idea that 
animals might make music.  If, as Spencer says, savages have their dance-chants—‘a kind 
scarcely to be dignified by the title musical: at most, they supply but the vaguest rudiment of 
music, properly so called’;87 for Parry the music of savages ‘shows that they hardly ever 
succeed in making orderly and well-balanced tunes, but either express themselves in a kind of 
vague wail or how, which is on the border land between music and informal expression of 
feeling, or else contrive little fragmentary figures of two or three notes.’88  The parallelisms 
continue right up the Great Chain of Musical Being. 
 Where does this leave Parry, or Spencer, as egalitarian musical thinkers when much 
of their work may seem to us today ethically indefensible, and patently unsympathetic?  
There is no easy answer, but as Rob Boddice notes the same paradox subsists in Victorian 
issues over vivisection (what he calls ‘sympathetic selection’) and eugenics (‘sympathy as 
callousness’).89  The syllogistic logic is as frightening in those debates as it is in music: 
sympathy ensured the survival of communities; vivisection (or eugenics) helps us survive 
because it teaches us more about the body; therefore, we should sympathize with vivisection 
(or eugenics) to enhance our survival.  This is not to imply that ethically variable Parry was a 
vivisectionist or eugenicist (though Spencer is reputed to have advocated vivisection under 
state control, and his philosophy was easily co-opted to the cause of eugenics),90 but there is 
reason to believe that music was broadly complicit in this culture of sympathetic distortion; 
why shouldn’t it be, if as Parry suggests there are as many sympathies as human beings, and 
as many human beings as there are liberalisms.  Parry may have taken from Mill ‘his 
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uncompromising position on liberty, his attitude and commitment towards democracy, his 
wider view of utilitarianism, and a system of logic so broad in breadth as to protect him from 
the dangers of formalism’,91 but he (in common with many Victorians) also drew breath from 
some indisputably racist contemporary ideas.  As Nugunn Wattanapat says, ‘Parry’s 
egalitarian consciousness violated socio-cultural evolutionary ideas.’92  Knowing this 
Wattanapat nonetheless argues for a more emollient, less self-conflicted, reading of Parry 
than I have previously suggested in my other writing—of ‘a highly eclectic and critical 
thinker’93—and certainly, as Jeremy Dibble suggests, he had ‘sympathy for egalitarianism 
and political reform.’94  I would argue, conversely, that Parry was emotionally selective, and 
that like many evolutionary musicologists he used sympathy in the cause of characteristically 
Victorian forms of liberal ideological multiplicity, for as much as Parry represents 
musicology of the time he also embodies a culture of egalitarianisms and the often 
contradictory meanings of overlapping consensus. 
 
4. Conclusion 
For us today there are clearly moral contradictions at the root of certain Victorian musical 
and political egalitarianisms, but one thing is sure: in the ideologically prismatic environment 
of Victorian liberalism equality and liberty were not just privileges but inalienable rights.  
How that came to be achieved in musical practice depended crucially upon variable 
approaches to the emotion of sympathy.  For John Curwen, Tonic Sol-fa used moveable doh 
to create ‘holy rivalry and blending sympathies’ as a model for liberal congregationalism; for 
Parry, music engendered altruism, the ‘direct expression of feeling and an appeal to 
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sympathetic feeling in others’95.  For John Rawls more recently sympathy is at the root of 
liberal reasonableness, itself the root of overlapping consensus.  The impartial spectator, he 
maintains for example, is endowed ‘with ideal powers of sympathy and imagination [. . . he 
is] the perfect rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as 
if these desires were his own.’96  As Victorian sympathy edged into deeper and deeper 
evolutionary waters, however, the powers of sympathy began to be reinterpreted, and with 
those changes came different biological and psychological models of the individual and 
community.  Eventually sympathy was superseded by the equally slippery word empathy 
[Einfühlung, feeling into], a term Edward Tichener translated into English in 1909 and used 
to denote an even closer feeling than sympathy.  There are today as many consensually 
overlapping empathies as there are liberalisms, libertarianism and egalitarianisms—indeed as 
there are sympathies—and empathy would seem to have superseded sympathy in 
musicological interest.97  This, I would suggest, makes the likes of Roger Scruton a relative 
exception. 
So what happened to Victorian musical sympathy?  Music psychology can help 
answer this question.  Referring to empathy’s origins in eighteenth-century models of 
sympathy, Eric Clarke, Tia DeNora and Jonna Vuoskoski suggest that sympathy is about 
imagining how one would feel, whereas empathy is on some level or other actually feeling it.  
Music, as a cultural artefact, is ‘a means of socially learning that sympathetic attitude.’98  To 
some extent this chimes with Edith Stein’s view of empathy as a processual act.  In Stein’s 
view empathy precedes sympathy: ‘Empathy is a mechanism of “receiving” the other’s inner 
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state, sympathy, a feeling that might (or might not) arise from it.’99  The rise of empathy and 
sympathy’s processual reconfiguration is itself a function of environmental pressures on 
liberalism.  As Edmund Fawcett recounts, driven by self-destructive liberal imperialism and 
faltering economic policies (to say nothing of the uncertainties engendered by the advent of 
Darwinian evolutionary randomness) liberalism from the 1880s to 1940s was a period of 
‘damaged ideals and broken dreams.’100  I wonder whether the rise of empathy parallels 
changes in our understanding of emotional selection.  Does Spencer anticipate empathy?  
Victorian psychologists Alexander Bain suggests he does, writing about Spencer in The 
Emotions and the Will (1859): emotional movements ‘while distinct from central spontaneity, 
are not movements of volition.  Their selection follows one law, the action of the will follows 
another law.  The most general fact of emotional selection is that stated by Mr. Herbert 
Spencer.’101  Spencer’s historical role in the liberation of sympathy is arguably paradoxical, 
but his place in the liberal context of Victorian musical culture cannot be underestimated.  
John Offer calls Rawls’ concept of the ‘equal liberty principle’ the modern counterpart of 
Spencer’s ‘equal freedom’.102   He and Darwin both contributed to the practice of overlapping 
consensus that was music of the time, and though at odds and often self-conflicting they were 
representative of the ideological kaleidoscope of Victorian liberalisms.  Curwen, Parry, 
Spencer and Darwin may have been only partially reasonable, but both individually and 
collectively their aspiration towards truth, virtue and sympathy is the essence of a liberal 
mindset; whether libertarian, egalitarian or both their use of music not only illustrates, but 
created, the very idea of an overlapping consensus. 
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